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ABSTRACT: Over the last decade, several clusters of scientists have 
been using animal cells in an attempt to grow meat. Known as in 
vitro, or cultured, meat, the technology involves tissue engineering 
muscle cells for potential consumption as food. Those supporting the 
technology articulate a diversity of potential benefits in producing 
meat in this way, which include environmental-, health-, innovation-, 
and animal-welfare-related benefits. This essay reports on interviews 
with scientists and animal activists involved in making and promot-
ing in vitro meat (IVM). While the technology remains in its infancy, 
its promotion has assertively been pursued with a set of promissory 
narratives designed to enroll potential funders, commercial investors, 
and consumers. The essay explores the ethical boundary-work—the 
drawing of boundaries around what constitutes ethical scientific prac-
tice—pursued in the creation of socio-technical expectations around 
IVM. In particular, it focuses on the emergence of an animal-libratory 
promissory narrative by exploring how ethically correct practice to-
ward animals is constructed and used to underpin notions of what 
IVM is and what it can do. The key contributions of the essay are to 
provide a detailed analysis of the situated ethics of IVM, and to make 
explicit the relatedness among ethics, promise, and ontology.
In vitro—or cultured—meat (IVM) involves growing muscle cells to 
form tissue that can be eaten as meat. This technological innovation 
is being pursued by several clusters of scientists in the world today 
who identify a range of important socio-technical challenges that, 
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they argue, tissue-engineered meat products could help address. 
In the context of this special issue, the focus of this essay is the 
promissory narratives associated with the technology that suggest 
that it can benefit other animals. It uses interview quotations—first 
from scientists developing IVM, and second from people with an 
existing association to animal-advocacy positions who have actively 
supported IVM—to demonstrate the broader articulations of how 
IVM can deliver a form of liberation for animals. In so doing, it re-
veals some of the complexities and challenges of establishing this 
promissory narrative, and how nuanced ethical framings are used 
by people in the field to deal with these. The distinctive contribu-
tion of this essay is twofold: first, it provides a detailed analysis of 
the situated ethics of IVM by articulating the ethical issues in rela-
tion to animals as they are understood by people active in the field; 
and second, it makes explicit the relatedness among ethics, promise, 
and ontology, drawing together existing literatures on the sociology 
of expectations and situated ethical analysis. 
 IVM is an early-stage technology. The main research laboratories 
are based in the United States, the Netherlands, Canada, and Swe-
den. These are typically small research groups of a handful of scien-
tists that are exploring basic mechanisms of muscle formation: in 
Utrecht, they are trying to derive an embryonic stem cell line from 
cows; in Gothenburg, they are exploring ways of binding muscle 
cells to larger starch cells to increase bulk; in Alberta, they are look-
ing to culture turkey fibroblasts; and in Missouri, they are applying 
three-dimensional printing technology to the production of muscle 
cells. In all of these cases, only very small quantities of tissue are 
produced, if any at all. The early-stage technology within the field 
has led some individuals to argue that the discursive genre of IVM 
remains, in important respects, a species of projective science fic-
tion.1 In an effort to address this perception, a team at Maastricht 
University are (at the time of this writing) working on what is, per-
haps, the most high-profile development in the field: the produc-
tion of the world’s first in vitro burger. In the course of over a year, 
the team has been repeating a process of growing muscle cells taken 
from cows into small slivers of muscle tissue, which are then frozen 
down. Once enough is collected, the team plans to thaw the tissue 
and assemble it in the form of a burger, to be cooked and consumed 
during a press conference, with the intention of demonstrating to 
the world that IVM is real and to be taken seriously. 
1. Susan McHugh, “Real Artificial: Tissue-cultured Meat, Genetically Modified Farm 
Animals, and Fictions,” Configurations 18:1–2 (2010): 181–197.
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 These claims and counter-claims over the status of IVM reflect the 
inherent ambiguities surrounding what is a very unusual technolog-
ical development. The techniques used were developed in biomedi-
cal settings in areas such as tissue engineering, stem cell science, and 
regenerative medicine, which propose to grow healthy tissue from 
cells to transplant into patients or to understand disease. In such re-
search attempts, culturing, or growing, tissue is quite normal. What 
makes IVM unusual is the intention to use tissue engineering to pro-
duce food for human consumption. Of course, meat production has 
a long history of scientific intervention,2 but up till now all of these 
approaches have culminated in the killing of a nonhuman animal, 
which is subdivided into parts, some of which are then eaten. With 
IVM, there is no whole animal to subdivide in this traditional sense; 
instead, the tissue is grown from cells. Birth, growth, and death ap-
pear in quite different forms to any farming method that has hith-
erto been used. IVM is unusual from both a biomedical and meat-
production perspective. 
 This capacity to transgress and disrupt the established boundaries 
around biomedicine and meat production has led me, among oth-
ers, to point to the ontological ambiguity of IVM.3 This tissue does 
not easily fit into the categories with which we make sense of meat-
ness and animal kinship. So distinct is this form of meat production 
from prior methods, that what IVM actually is—its status as meat 
and how it fits with conceptualizations of life and death—remains 
contested and unclear. This ambiguity underlies Cor van der Weele’s 
observation that IVM provokes both “wow” and “yuck” responses 
when people are first confronted by the notion.4 It is unusual be-
cause it is different, but it is also unusual because it lacks a broadly 
accepted understanding of what it is and what it can do. In this 
essay, I document some of the promissory and boundary work un-
dertaken by those in the field to assert a meaning, and a vision for 
productive use, for IVM in relationship to animal liberation. 
2. Richard Twine, Animals as Biotechnology: Ethics, Sustainability and Critical Animal Stud-
ies (London: Earthscan, 2010).
3. Neil Stephens, “In Vitro Meat: Zombies on the Menu?” SCRIPTed 7:2 (2010): 394–
401; Clemens Driessen and Michiel Korthals, “Pig Towers and In-Vitro Meat: Disclosing 
Moral Worlds by Design,” Social Studies of Science 42:6 (2012): 797–820; McHugh, “Real 
Artificial” (above, n. 1).
4. Cor van der Weele, “In Vitro Meat: Promises and Responses: Cooperation between 
Science, Social Research and Ethics,” in Global Food Security: Ethical and Legal Challenges, 
ed. Carlos M. Romeo Casabona, Leire Escajedo San Epifanio, and Aitziber Emaldi Cirión 
(Wageningen, the Netherlands: Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2010), pp. 507–512; 
van der Weele, “A Taboo on Moral Solutions,” Simulacrum 15:3–4 (2007): 28–30.
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Promissory Narratives 
 There is now a broad literature within the sociology of expec-
tations that explores the role of future orientated visions for the 
application of new technologies, to the ongoing framing of these 
technologies in the present. Drawing on this literature, I argue that 
IVM is what Adam Hedgecoe calls a promissory science, one that 
“exists more in the speculations and promises of its supporters than 
in terms of scientific results and marketable products.”5 While to-
day, the field is short on published papers and even shorter on ed-
ible tissue, it does not lack for speculation or promise. A diversity of 
promissory narratives have developed rationales for why we should 
invest in IVM technology: for example, the environmental benefits 
of meat production with lower greenhouse-gas emissions; land, wa-
ter, and energy use;6 the health benefits of meat with no animal 
disease or antibiotic buildup;7 the space-travel benefits of meat that 
does not require access to a farm for production;8 food-innovation 
benefits of meat that could have superior appearance and taste, and 
lower cost, than more traditional sources;9 and (the focus of this es-
say) the animal-liberation benefits of meat, which does not involve 
killing significant numbers of animals.
 Here, I analyze the emergent discourses within the IVM field that 
seek to justify this animal-liberation-oriented promissory narrative. 
I highlight multiple accounts of what kind of form the narrative 
could take and who (human/nonhuman) benefits of it, and detail 
points of tension that divide the community or make the promissory 
narrative harder to sustain. In this regard, my work follows themes 
found in Martyn Pickersgill’s interrogation of the therapeutic prom-
ise addressing psychiatric conditions;10 Paul Martin and colleagues’ 
5. Adam Hedgecoe, The Politics of Personalised Medicine: Pharmacogenetics in the Clinic 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 27.
6. Hanna L. Tuomisto and M. Joost Teixeira de Mattos, “Environmental Impacts of 
Cultured Meat Production,” Environmental Science & Technology 45:14 (2011): 6117–
6123.
7. Z. F. Bhat and Hina Bhat, “Animal-free Meat Biofabrication,” American Journal of Food 
Technology 6:6 (2011): 441–459.
8. Morris A. Benjaminson, James A. Gilchriest, and M. Lorenz, “In Vitro Edible Muscle 
Protein Production System (MPPS): Stage 1, Fish,” Acta Astronaut 51:12 (2002): 879–
889.
9. Isha Datar and Mirko Betti, “Possibilities for an In Vitro Meat Production System,” 
Innovative Food Science and Emerging Technologies 11:13 (2010): 13–22. 
10. Martyn Pickersgill, “‘Promising’ Therapies: Neuroscience, Clinical Practice, and the 
Treatment of Psychopathy,” Sociology of Health & Illness 33:3 (2011): 448–464.
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discussion of “communities of promise” regarding stem cells;11 and 
Richard Milne’s study of food-based futures and plant-derived phar-
maceutical crops.12 These essays, along with my own, explore the 
relationship between the promissory and the material as a set of 
contextual, contingent, and contested forms of practice. Pickersgill 
and Milne in particular focus on the ways in which the promissory 
and the material provoke ontological consideration about what con-
stitutes disease, cures, and food. I build on Robert Chiles’s work by 
also applying the sociology of expectations to IVM.13 Chiles explores 
the roles of hype, accounts of previous visions of the future, and 
myths in establishing the range of these expectations; in contrast, 
I emphasize the centrality of discourses about ethics to only one 
promissory narrative—that of animal liberation. By drawing on 
empirical material from both scientists and others associated with 
animal advocacy, including animal rights and veganism, I demon-
strate that the IVM animal-liberation promissory narrative emerges 
from the discourses of both sets of actors. It is a narrative that, as 
will be demonstrated, has also been contested by some within the 
animal rights community. To explore the processes of embedding 
ethical value within the promissory, I employ the concept of ethical 
boundary-work. 
Ethical Boundary-Work 
 Steven Wainwright and colleagues developed the notion of ethi-
cal boundary-work to describe their ethnographic data collected 
from scientists engaged in embryonic stem cell science, some of 
whom would destroy human embryos to derive stem cell lines.14 
Wainwright and colleagues extend Thomas Gieryn’s notion of 
boundary-work to move beyond Gieryn’s focus on establishing the 
11. Paul Martin, Nik Brown, and Alison Kraft, “From Bedside to Bench? Communities 
of Promise, Translational Research and the Making of Blood Stem Cells,” Science as 
Culture 17:1 (2008): 29–41.
12. Richard Milne, “Drawing Bright Lines: Food and the Futures of Biopharming,” The 
Sociological Review 58 (Supplement s1) (2010): 133–151.
13. Robert M. Chiles, “If They Come, We Will Build It: In Vitro Meat and the Discursive 
Struggle over Future Agrofood Expectations,” Agriculture and Human Values, February 1, 
2013. http://new-harvest.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/rmchiles_2012-if_they 
_come.pdf.
14. Steven P. Wainwright, Clare Williams, Mike Michael, Bobbie Farsides, and Alan 
Cribb, “Ethical Boundary-Work in the Embryonic Stem Cell Laboratory,” Sociology of 
Health & Illness 28:6 (2006): 732–748.
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rhetorical boundaries between science and nonscience15 to include 
how scientists draw the boundaries of ethical scientific activity—or, 
as the same research group described more recently, how “research-
ers draw boundaries within science, reflexively ordering practices 
along a spectrum from ‘more’ to ‘less’ ethical.”16 In their earlier 
work, Wainwright and colleagues report “observing the delineation 
of a positive ‘ethical space’ which scientists occupy”; they identify a 
process of social demarcation that “simultaneously serves to define 
and defend the work of scientists involved in ethically controversial 
science.”17 The concept has also been employed to study in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) by Lucy Frith and colleagues,18 preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis by Kathryn Ehrich and colleagues,19 and stem cell 
science in China by Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner.20 Two authors 
have applied the ethical boundary-work conceptualization to hu-
man/animal relations, with Tora Holmberg focusing on scientists 
working with transgenic mice used in research experiments,21 and 
Pru Hobson-West reporting on interviews with researchers conduct-
ing animal experiments on a variety of species.22 
 The above case studies describe their work as reports of situated 
ethics, highlighting the importance of documenting ethical com-
plexity as it is understood by those involved in conducting the work. 
15. Thomas F. Gieryn, “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-
Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists,” American Socio-
logical Review 48:6 (1983): 781–795; Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on 
the Line (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
16. Caragh Brosnan, Alan Cribb, Steven P. Wainwright, and Clare Williams, “Neurosci-
entists’ Everyday Experiences of Ethics: The Interplay of Regulatory, Professional, Per-
sonal and Tangible Ethical Spheres,” Sociology of Health & Illness 20:10 (2013): 1–16.
17. Wainwright et al., “Ethical Boundary-Work in the Embryonic Stem Cell Labora-
tory” (above, n. 14), pp. 744, 745.
18. Lucy Firth, Ann Jacoby, and Mark Gabbay, “Ethical Boundary-Work in the Infertil-
ity Clinic,” Sociology of Health & Illness 33:4 (2011): 570–585.
19. Kathryn Ehrich, Clare Williams, and Bobbie Farsides, “The Embryo as Moral Work 
Object: PGD/IVF Staff Views and Experiences,” Sociology of Health & Illness 30:5 (2008): 
772–787.
20. Margaret E. Sleeboom-Faulkner, “Boundary Making and ‘Good’ Stem Cell Research 
(SCR) in Mainland China: Including Bioethics, Excluding Debate,” East Asian Science, 
Technology and Society: An International Journal 4:1 (2010): 31–51.
21. Tora Holmberg, “Tail Tales: How Researchers Handle Transgenic Dilemmas,” New 
Genetics and Society 29:1 (2010): 37–54.
22. Pru Hobson-West, “Ethical Boundary-work in the Animal Research Laboratory,” 
Sociology 46:4 (2012): 649–663.
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This is the position that I also adopt.23 But my case study also allows 
for an exploration of the relationship between ethical boundary- 
work and promissory narratives, and how this invoking of positions 
along a spectrum running from less to more ethical attempts to es-
tablish a productive use of IVM technology—namely, what it can 
do—and, by extension, also attempts to establish a stable account 
of what IVM is. 
Methods 
 I write from a science and technology studies perspective, draw-
ing on a tradition of qualitative and ethnographic investigations of 
scientific knowledge-making in practice.24 The analysis is informed 
by a methodological relativism that recognizes scientific claims as 
a product of social negotiation, not allowing the truth or falsity of 
a scientific claim to be used as explanatory variables for its accep-
tance.25 I report on ongoing fieldwork—thirty-nine semi-structured 
interviews with individuals engaged in the field—observations at 
meetings in the field, and documentary analysis of scientific papers, 
websites, and other textual and visual forms. The interviews were 
conducted between 2010 and 2013, before the proposed Maastricht 
in vitro burger was complete. Interviewees have been offered ano-
nymity in as much as is possible in a small field of this type, and 
quotes are presented in accordance with this; one interviewee ex-
plicitly requested to be identified and consequently has been. The 
23. For examples of ethical considerations of IVM that do not adopt a situated ethics 
approach, see Patrick D. Hopkins and Austin Dacey, “Vegetarian Meat: Could Technol-
ogy Save Animals and Satisfy Meat Eaters?” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental 
Ethics 21:6 (2008): 579–596; Evelyn Pluhar, “Meat and Morality: Alternatives to Factory 
Farming,” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23:5 (2010): 455–468; Stellan 
Welin, Julie Gold, and Johanna Berlin, “In Vitro Meat: What Are the Moral Issues,” in 
The Philosophy of Food, ed. David M. Kaplan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2012), pp. 292–304; Stellan Welin and Cor van der Weele, “Cultured Meat: Will It 
Separate Us from Nature?” in Climate Change and Sustainable Development: Ethical Per-
spectives on Land Use and Food Production, ed. Thomas Potthast and Simon Meisch (Wa-
geningen, the Netherlands: Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2010), pp. 348–354; and 
Emilio José Armaza-Armaza and Julia Armaza-Galdos, “Legal and Ethical Challenges 
Regarding Edible In Vitro Meat Production,” in Global Food Security (above, n. 4), pp. 
513–520.
24. Edward J. Hackett, Olga Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch, and Judy Wajcman, eds., 
The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2008); Karin Knorr Cetina, Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
25. David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1976); Harry M. Collins, “Stages in the Empirical Programme of Relativism,” Social 
Studies of Science 11:1 (1981): 3–10.
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quotes presented here have been selected because they represent 
clear articulations of accounts found in the data. In what follows, in-
terview data is first presented from scientists who are attempting to 
make IVM, followed by that of individuals associated with animal- 
liberation activism and who have supported IVM technology. 
In Vitro Meat Scientists
 As described above, there are emerging discourses of multiple 
promissory narratives regarding IVM. Typically, the interviewees 
placed differing levels of emphasis on the narratives that were most 
important to them personally and that they considered were most 
likely to foster broader support for the technology. In this section, I 
present a range of interview extracts with scientists who are, or have 
recently been, active in IVM research. The quotes draw together two 
themes: how the interviewees relate their own interest in animal-
liberation issues to their IVM research, and how they imagine that 
the potential benefits for animal liberation may frame the technol-
ogy’s future development. In this way, they bind together both per-
sonal ethical reflections and an account of imagined ethical reflec-
tions of other people, present and future.
 We begin with a response to a question about the role of animal- 
liberation issues by an individual who has supervised laboratory 
work on IVM: “I think it’s a motivation for a lot of people. Not 
personally for me because I would be a little bit of a hypocrite if I 
would say that because I just eat regular meats. . . . I think it’s nice 
that you can help people that are vegetarian . . . [but] it’s not a per-
sonal motivation for me.” This provides a glimpse of how different 
scientists within the field position the various promissory narra-
tives in different ways. This interviewee acknowledges the animal- 
liberation narrative, but also demotes it below other promises. He/
she also articulates the potential for hypocrisy and the ethical ten-
sion that goes with this. The beneficiaries of IVM are people who are 
vegetarian, but even though it is “nice,” it is not essential that it helps 
them.
 This same interviewee continues to identify some of the chal-
lenges in asserting IVM as a technology of animal liberation: “The 
biggest problem at the moment is that the cells are cultured in a 
medium that contains fetal bovine serum, which is basically blood 
from calves, and you don’t want that if you want to have an animal-
free meat.” In biomedical tissue engineering, it is not unusual to 
use fetal bovine serum as a medium to promote cell growth; it con-
tains high levels of growth factors that are conductive to cell divi-
sion. Producing it involves extracting blood from the fetus of a cow 
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immediately after the mother’s slaughter—also resulting in the fe-
tus’s death—usually in slaughterhouses that provide meat for hu-
man consumption. Given this, the early stage IVM research de-
scribed by the interviewee is not slaughter-free; tissue—blood—from 
animals raised and killed for meat production is used.
 When responding to this issue, every scientist I have interviewed 
explains that alternative forms of medium will be generated in the 
future, and scientists at the University of Amsterdam have been ac-
tive in developing a nonanimal-derived alternative based on blue-
green algae—an example of the IVM field moving in a different di-
rection from biomedical tissue engineering in an effort to establish a 
sound animal-liberation narrative and practice. Such accounts draw 
together the ethical, the imagined, and the material: the ethical be-
ing the future capacity of blue-green algae to lessen the role of dead-
animal body parts in IVM production; the imagined being future 
scenarios in which blue-green algae function as a medium within 
which muscle cells grow productively; and the material being the 
fetal bovine serum used today. 
 This interviewee continues by discussing another challenge in 
presenting IVM as a technology of animal liberation:
Second of all is that we can culture adult stem cells and they are derived from 
muscle tissue from live animals. . . . [W]e can culture those [cells] for a couple 
of months, but then they die. That means that you can produce a lot of meat, 
but in order to continue the process, you would again need to take a biopsy. 
So you would need to take biopsies at regular intervals, kill an animal and 
isolate the stem cells from the muscle. That’s also not something that you 
want, so what I would like is that we could culture embryonic stem cells from 
either a pig or a cow, because they can be cultured indefinitely. 
This discussion focuses on the issue of how you get cells from a living 
animal from which IVM can be grown—quite a different issue from 
the previous fetal bovine serum one. The practice of getting cells 
from a living animal is not one that the field hopes to replace with 
a nonanimal-sourced alternative; instead, these nonhuman animal 
cells remain the essence of IVM technology, the harnessing of their 
growth potential central to any animal-liberation narrative. This in-
terviewee is the first of several that position what I call the cell source 
animal: a new, IVM-specific moral entity that IVM proponents seek 
to demonstrate care and responsibility toward. These cell source 
animals are typically imagined future animals, and the ways that 
their lifestyles and well-beings are constructed is vital to the ethi-
cal boundary-work underpinning the emergent animal-liberatory 
promissory narrative.
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 This scenario echoes familiar debates concerning human embry-
onic stem cell science that focus on the human embryo as the cell 
source, with different actors positioning themselves as responsible 
decision-makers and guardians of tissue with sensitive provenance.26 
However, as is made clear in the above, the interviewee positions 
the relative moral challenges of adult and embryonic stem cells in 
exactly the opposite way to that which is usual in the human stem 
cell debates in Europe and North America. Applying Wainwright 
and colleagues’ and Brosnan and colleagues’ notions of the ethical 
spectrum,27 we can describe the human case as one in which adult 
stem cell research is positioned as less problematic than embryonic 
derived cells. Cell lines derived from the human embryo are posi-
tioned as either so ethically problematic that research on them is 
prohibited or else as ethically sensitive material that can be used for 
research, although only under strictly regulated ethical oversight. 
The IVM scientist quoted above constructs the spectrum quite differ-
ently, with the long-term necessity for ongoing biopsies taken from 
donor source animals—and the resulting animal suffering—identi-
fied as the most ethically problematic practice. Embryonic stem cells 
are presented as ethically preferable because, the interviewee sug-
gests, the destruction of one embryo can result in a cell line that 
can be cultured indefinitely, implying the potential production of 
infinite muscle tissue and infinite meat.
 As is the case with many of the quotes presented in this essay, 
the empirical validity of the claims surrounding IVM technology 
may be questioned; interviewees are typically aware of this, and 
themselves articulate these challenges. In the above example, we 
may question the claim that an embryonic cell line can be cultured 
indefinitely; the significantly larger body of work on human and 
mouse embryonic stem cell science suggests that cells demonstrate 
increasing levels of chromosomal changes the more they are cul-
tured. These could impact the stability of the cell line and the out-
come of their use. Embedded within the promissory narratives are 
accounts of technological feats that are currently not possible and 
26. Søren Holm, “Going to the Roots of the Stem Cell Controversy,” Bioethics 16:6 
(2002): 493–507; Sarah Parry, “The Politics of Cloning: Mapping the Rhetorical Con-
vergence of Embryos and Stem Cells in Parliamentary Debates,” New Genetics and Soci-
ety 22:2 (2003): 177–200; Neil Stephens, Paul Atkinson, and Peter Glasner, “The UK 
Stem Cell Bank: Securing the Past, Validating the Present, Protecting the Future,” Sci-
ence as Culture 17:1 (2008): 43–56.
27. Wainwright et al., “Ethical Boundary-Work in the Embryonic Stem Cell Labora-
tory” (above, n. 14); Brosnan et al., “Neuroscientists’ Everyday Experiences of Ethics” 
(above, n. 16).
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potentially never will be—in Hedgecoe’s terms, the work of promis-
sory science, which is a discursive strategy found both here and in 
many other cases of scientific innovation.28 
 There can also be tensions between the animal-liberation narra-
tive and research practices today. The embryos used by this group to 
derive animal cell lines are attained by conducting an IVF procedure 
utilizing bull or boar semen stocks and unfertilized eggs extracted 
from the ovaries of cows or sows that have been commercially 
slaughtered. As with the use of fetal bovine serum, this issue is typi-
cally set within a context of ongoing scientific research, potentially 
leading to future contexts in which these problems are overcome.
 A different account of the imagined cell source animal is pro-
vided by the next interviewee, who is a prominent spokesperson for 
the field who eats meat and is based in a different country from the 
first. Describing his/her own motivations, he/she explains that “I 
find industrial animal production disgusting. Sure I do. And I really 
want to contribute to break the back of that production. So [animal 
liberation] is a very good number two in my motivation [to be in-
volved in IVM], but even without that, the environment would be 
more than enough for me.” Here, the interviewee identifies environ-
mental issues as the dominant cause for his/her interest in IVM, but 
that animal liberation is a strong second. Further describing his/her 
preferred technical approach to IVM production:
I think I can feed the world taking the umbilical cords from ten sows per year, 
give or take. It’s just a fantastic potential. I think you get about five million 
cells from an umbilical cord. And they can definitely develop into muscle 
cells. . . . But it shows that you can treat these pigs as queens. . . . There’s no 
slaughtering, nothing. They give birth to these piglets. And I think that is a 
much, much, much better frame for selling this than to say that you have an 
embryo stem cell culture, which the Dutch people tried to develop. . . . Be-
cause you can show pictures of these pigs and animal welfare people see that 
this is okay. As long as they accept that we keep dogs, they will accept that we 
keep pigs and just take care of the umbilical cord, which you throw away in 
any case.
 This account contrasts quite distinctly from the previous inter-
viewee’s in three important ways: 1) the embryonic cell source is 
deemed problematic; 2) the interviewee introduces a new cell source 
to the ethical spectrum of that was not even discussed by the first in-
terviewee, and positions this new option as the most ethical choice: 
cells from umbilical cords; and 3) the account also places industrial 
28. Hedgecoe, The Politics of Personalised Medicine (above, n. 5). 
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animal production as it exists today as the least ethical option. The 
account also explicitly links a positive ethical status with the ca-
pacity to sell the tissue. The interviewee conjures a food production 
system in which umbilical cord tissue—deemed a waste product—be-
comes the source of productivity.29 The interviewee recognizes that a 
successful single embryonic cell line could potentially have a greater 
capacity to produce muscle tissue than a single umbilical cord. How-
ever, single cords are presented as attainable in a less ethically and 
practically problematic manner than embryonic cells lines, meaning 
that the umbilical cord cells’ lower growth potential per unit can be 
sidestepped by collecting a larger number of cords. This is premised 
on an equivalence drawn between the living conditions provided 
for the sows, who can live as “queens,” and those of animals kept 
in domestic environments as pets. Pet-keeping is identified as a nor-
mal, ethically acceptable practice, bound in the same space as um-
bilical cord–based IVM production in which the pig’s reproductive 
labor can supply umbilical cord in an unproblematic manner. 
 During my observational work, I experienced another variant on 
the cell source animal issue based on adult cells taken from living 
animals. During a conference panel on IVM at the 2012 Tissue En-
gineering and Regenerative Medicine World Congress, one of the 
speakers suggested a possible future cell-sourcing system based on 
“donor herds.” The argument presented was that instead of farm-
ing large numbers of live animals from which biopsies of a small 
number of cells would be taken, thus allowing the animals to live, 
it would be better to have a smaller number of donor herds that 
are killed and from which all viable cells are used to derive IVM. 
This version of the animal-liberation narrative suggests that killing 
a small number of animals in the donor herd for IVM would be bet-
ter than keeping much larger numbers of animals for it, and that 
both versions are better than industrial meat production as prac-
ticed today. Like the previous two accounts, this version articulates 
a particular form of IVM industrial production and interlaces ethical 
29. The positioning of tissue as either redundant or waste that can then be leveraged 
for productive value is another recurrent theme in tissue engineering promissory nar-
ratives: for example, “spare” human embryos destined for destruction that can be used 
for deriving human embryonic stem cell lines; human umbilical-cord blood banked for 
future therapeutic uses; or patients’ surgically necessary removal of spleen tissue, which 
is subsequently used for a commercially viable cell line. See Parry, “The Politics of Clon-
ing” (above, n. 26); Nik Brown and Alison Kraft, “Blood Ties: Banking the Stem Cell 
Promise,” Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 18:3–4 (2006): 313–327; and 
Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell, Tissue Economies: Blood, Organs, and Cell Lines 
in Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).
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judgements within it. The accounts of the first two interviewees, 
along with that presented at the conference panel, construct their 
animal-liberation narratives in relation to the differing cell sourc-
ing practices they propose. However, IVM proponents also conjure 
imagined IVM consumers who are situated as specific types of ethi-
cally informed economic decision-makers. The tastes, economic ca-
pacities, and ethical preferences of these consumers are embedded 
within the promissory narratives. The following interview with an 
early career researcher in the field first identifies the environmental 
promissory narrative as his/her key interest in the field, and then 
articulates a version of the animal-liberation narrative that draws on 
notions of scientific advancement:
The first level is environmental impact. The other level is animal rights, be-
cause there’s basically no good reason to have a whole cow, a whole chicken, 
that we bring up and then we kill it and it suffers. So if we just want to have 
meat, maybe it’s just much easier to cultivate what we need. So that in itself is 
also a motivation. I mean, let’s advance. Are we able to achieve something like 
that? Are we advanced enough to develop a process where we can actually skip 
or go over the normal nature of animals in general? I mean, every animal, or 
every meat-eating animal, is feeding on other animals. If we were able to actu-
ally come over that part, that would be extremely great.
 This account positions the key ethical benefit of IVM as the po-
tential ability of tissue engineering to disaggregate animal bodies—
“a whole cow, a whole chicken”—into separate components, which 
would be beneficial because human society could—“to cultivate 
what we need,” without engendering pain. Scientific technique is 
positioned as ethically beneficial because it could allow humans to 
“‘go over’ the normal nature of animals” by no longer killing other 
nonhuman animals for eating.30 This formulation is subsequently 
embedded within a specific vision of imagined consumers and social 
relationships:
IntervIewer: And you think in vitro meat would mean getting over that?
IntervIewee: Not right from the beginning maybe, and I still believe that people 
will always have normal meat, normal cows, but maybe then more on an ex-
tremely high-priced luxury level. I mean, like us today, if you want to have 
really good meat like Kobe, you have to pay a lot of money. And maybe in the 
future it will be like that, that if you want to have meat, you really have to pay 
a lot of money and you don’t eat it on a regular basis, but you have in vitro 
meat instead. 
30. “Go over” in this context means “overcome.”
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This response invokes an imagined consumer who is motivated to 
purchase IVM because it offers a product without, nonhuman ani-
mal suffering, but who at particular times may still choose to con-
sume meat associated with suffering. This is related to a financial 
decision-making process that links price and occasional luxury to 
morally legitimate food-buying practices. The interviewee acknowl-
edges that this is only one possible future scenario and that others 
may exist. This account also raises another issue in the animal-lib-
eration narrative: namely, the ontological ambiguity regarding what 
IVM actually is. The interviewee suggests that people will continue 
to consume “normal meat,” and in doing so alludes to the “other-
ness” of IVM. Concerning animal-liberation narratives, ambiguity 
over what IVM is—whether it is meat, a meat alternative, or some-
thing else altogether—frames whether the narratives challenge or 
normalize continued meat consumption.
 Of the twenty-three scientists I have interviewed to date, five 
have self-identified as not being meat-eaters. The following quote 
from a senior team leader provides an articulation of their position 
on meat-eating, and relates this to both their own involvement in 
IVM research and other potential consumers for cultured meat:
[Animal liberation] is a very high motivating factor for me and I very easily 
stopped eating chicken and any fowl products a long time ago because 
of . . . how they’re being produced in the factories . . . it’s very disturbing. My 
not eating meat is not from “Oh it’s disgusting, I can’t eat another living ani-
mal,” it’s because of the more animal rights issues about how they’re being 
kept. . . . There is a wide spectrum of vegetarians, and there are vegetarians 
who said they would eat in vitro meat because they know that no animal was 
killed in order to make this product. There are others who absolutely wouldn’t 
eat it—I mean why? So why eat another animal? . . . You think there are other 
people who are like you, I mean everybody wants to be normal. . . . If given a 
choice [that] here’s some meat made by the animals that have been suffering 
and here’s meat made where we haven’t had to kill any animal, I think that 
people, if they can afford it, would buy the meat without suffering [associated 
with it]. I can’t imagine any human being who wouldn’t do that. Unless . . . it 
tastes like crap.
 This interviewee clearly identifies a form of animal-liberation 
narrative as central to his/her own involvement in IVM research: 
one related to his/her own food-consumption patterns. At the same 
time, ethical ambiguity is acknowledged concerning the narrative 
by articulating two alternative accounts attributed to vegetarians—
whether they would or would not eat IVM. The interviewee then 
conjures an imagined set of consumers who align with their own 
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ethical values and would choose the meat without associated suffer-
ing over meat with it, given broader assumptions about consumers’ 
financial statuses and flavor preferences. This hypothetical choice 
between meat with or without suffering assumes all else is equal, 
bounding IVM as the same thing as whole-animal-produced meat, 
the only difference being the relative positions on the ethical spec-
trum; in so doing, he/she asserts both what IVM can do and what 
IVM is.
 The quotes discussed in this first empirical section have demon-
strated a diversity in the framing of IVM as a technology of animal 
liberation. Clear differences exist in the extent to which animal-
liberation narratives motivate individual scientists’ involvement 
in the field, which relate to their own personal understanding of 
current meat-producing practices and their own ethical subjectivity. 
Moreover, some relate this to the ethical subjectivity of imagined 
consumers in complicated ways. For example, two interviewees em-
bedded their own moral assumptions in their conception of IVM as 
a technology of animal liberation, while another used his/her own 
current meat-eating practice to identify potential hypocrisy in align-
ing him-/herself with the animal-liberation narrative. A key com-
ponent in drawing moral boundaries around IVM that positions it 
as a technology of animal liberation is an account of the ethical ap-
propriateness of the experiences of the cell donor animal. However, 
the quotes reveal multiple socio-technical models of how cell donor 
animals’ well-being should be best protected: namely, via cell extrac-
tion from adult, embryonic, or umbilical nonhuman animal tissue. 
 The next section focuses on accounts of individuals who have 
aligned themselves with a pro-IVM position, but are not trained 
laboratory scientists and have links to animal-liberation activity be-
yond their IVM work. 
In Vitro Meat Proponents Associated with  
Animal-Liberation Positions 
 The terminologies and values of groups associated with forms of 
animal liberation vary widely in ways beyond the scope of this es-
say. Diversity also exists in the opinions of people engaged in animal 
advocacy regarding IVM. This section discusses accounts of the eth-
ics of IVM by individuals who have self-identified as aligning them-
selves with IVM and have manifested this commitment in some 
form of practical action. The first set of quotes is from an interview 
with a key member of the IVM campaign group New Harvest—an 
individual who does not eat meat and has a history of engaging with 
issues of vegetarianism. This interviewee relates his/her account of 
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the cell source animal to critiques of IVM based on the harm caused 
by cell extraction:
I have seen discussions on this question of whether a single cell taken from a 
farm animal would be just as bad as having 40 billion animals raised and 
slaughtered each year. That to me seems really absurd. I think there has been 
at least some students, I guess, in sort of animal rights, proposing that line of 
argument. So there are moral theories under which numbers don’t really mat-
ter, and so if you harm one individual, that’s no different than harming a 
billion individuals. So on that sort of theory, the Stalinist purges or the Holo-
caust is [sic] no worse than, you know, a single death. I think that that sort of 
moral view seems to have very little credence.
This quote articulates a critique of the IVM animal-liberation narra-
tive attributed to some within the movement that any form of ani-
mal suffering is unacceptable and, as such, IVM is unacceptable. To 
counter this, the interviewee invokes an ethical spectrum on which 
killing 40 billion animals is far worse than taking a biopsy from only 
one. As the interview proceeds, he/she locates more practices on the 
ethical spectrum: 
But I think the harm to animals that were used for cell donors has to be con-
sidered. It matters. But for me, the scale of the benefits [outweigh] the harm to 
the cell donors, which would be very small. The lives of the cell donors would 
be very much better than the life of a normal farm animal. Cell donors could 
be free-range, muscle biopsies can be done with anesthesia, [and] these ani-
mals could have lives that are as good as those of a domesticated pet.
Once again, here the life experience of the cell source animal is po-
sitioned as equivalent to those of animals kept in domestic envi-
ronments as pets. The interviewee articulates a form of adult cell 
sourcing that involves no killing and minimizes suffering through 
anesthesia; in so doing, he/she provides a very different vision of 
an adult cell source system than the donor herd vision discussed 
above.31 Thus this interviewee is another example of an individual 
who personally has ceased meat-eating, but retains IVM-eating in 
his/her vision of the future and as a key element of animal libera-
tion. The interviewee directly addresses this issue in the following 
exchange:
IntervIewee: I think we should be eating plant-based proteins.
IntervIewer: You feel that it would be easier to move to in vitro meat, or more 
likely, than [for] people to become vegetarian or vegan?
31. Cf. Holmberg, “Tail Tales” (above, n. 21), on the ethical boundary-work of anesthe-
tized biopsies on transgenic mice.
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IntervIewee: Yes, and I think there’s strong empirical evidence of that. It is very, 
very difficult to change people’s diets, particularly beyond a certain age and 
income level.
Here, the ethical spectrum loses its linearity. This account deals 
with the ethical ambiguity of preferring a vegan-based protein sys-
tem while supporting IVM-based protein systems by referencing 
the limited success of vegan-based animal-liberation narratives. Es-
sentially, this account problematizes veganism as a practical strat-
egy for achieving animal liberation, locating it within a realm of 
ideal though essentially unrealistic approaches to addressing global 
animal suffering. This is in contrast to IVM that is positioned as a 
potentially practical long-term strategy. This account of a trade-off 
between the ideal and the practical, based on a problematization 
of veganism, is also present in different forms in the following two 
accounts. 
 The next interview is with the IVM campaign leader of PETA (Peo-
ple for the Ethical Treatment of Animals), a U.S.-based animal rights 
organization. Its involvement in IVM involves three facets: the on-
going promotion of the technology; a $1 million prize to whoever 
first sells a significant quantity of IVM in the United States; and its 
funding of a three-year post-doc research post at an American uni-
versity. Media reports at the time of its announcement of the prize 
attributed to PETA’s then director as saying that the decision to back 
the technology caused “near civil war” within the organization.32 
Addressing this issue, my interviewee responded:
Well, there were a few very vocal people who were opposed to it and, yeah, I 
mean, “there was a near civil war”? We have spirited internal debates about a 
wide range of issues and tactics. . . . Everything you choose to spend money 
on, you’re choosing not to spend money on something else. . . . There were 
two principal objections. One, PETA shouldn’t be involved in helping the 
meat industry to perpetuate itself. And two, meat is meat, so went the argu-
ment. I was pretty vigorously on the other side of that discussion.
The interviewee acknowledges a diversity of views within his/her 
own organization about the appropriateness of framing IVM as 
a technology of animal liberation. The challenges to the promis-
sory discourse identified invoke problematic economic relations to 
whole-animal meat production, and that meat consumption of any 
provenance, irrespective of the involvement of slaughter or suffer-
ing in its production, is not suitable for PETA’s support. 
32. John Schwartz, “PETA’s Latest Tactic: $1 Million for Fake Meat,” New York Times, 
April 21, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/21/us/21meat.html?hp.
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 Expanding on his/her personal position on the issue, the inter-
viewee responds to a question about whether he/she would eat IVM 
should PETA’s prize be awarded:
At a press conference, maybe. I haven’t eaten meat in twenty-three years, so 
it’s not something that I’m salivating to do. But if we . . . thought that long-
term vegans eating in vitro meat would somehow be a useful thing for helping 
animals, sure. . . . For us, our question in every situation is “What’s in the best 
interest of animals?” And if something is, we would try to put aside aesthetic 
revulsion and do it. So, obviously, the bar for eating a factory-farmed chicken 
would be extraordinarily high. The bar for eating in vitro meat wouldn’t have 
to be especially high. There would just have to be a convincing reason for how 
it would be useful. . . . According to my discussions with [New Harvest] . . . the 
amount of animal product required was extremely small and the potential 
benefit, obviously, is beyond anything we can easily imagine.
This account positions “animals” as the beneficiary of IVM technol-
ogy. It positions IVM, and meat in general, as something that could 
provoke “aesthetic revulsion” and marks it as a dietary practice that 
the interviewee would not routinely engage in. Personal consump-
tion would only be considered in the context of a press conference 
or some other outlet that delivered what the interviewee consid-
ers helpful to animals. This is located in a context of significant 
potential benefit, a vision based on accepting a future imaginary 
promoted by New Harvest. It draws boundaries around IVM con-
sumption that situates it as not an ethically preferred position for 
the interviewee him-/herself, although maintaining that it would be 
good for animals if other people embrace it.
 I then asked the interviewee whether he/she felt any ambiguity 
about aligning with a field in the biosciences in which the individu-
als involved may also be working on animal experiments, an issue 
on which PETA strongly campaigns against: “That was significantly 
less of a concern. Any time that somebody who is an animal experi-
menter spends doing nonanimal experimentation is a victory. . . . It’s 
less time that they’re spending torturing animals.” Wainwright and 
colleagues’ original specification of ethical boundary-work argued 
that scientists destroying human embryos discursively produced 
a nuanced space in which their actions both acknowledged their 
complex personal ethical constructions and deemed their actions 
legitimate.33 The above quote demonstrates that, more broadly, the 
IVM animal-liberation narrative involves defining shared spaces in 
33. Wainwright et al., “Ethical Boundary-Work in the Embryonic Stem Cell Labora-
tory” (above, n. 14).
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which groups that are sometimes situated in a relationship of hostil-
ity, such as the biosciences that can involve vivisection and animal-
advocacy groups, can in some form unify around a common prom-
issory narrative and the strategies intended to realize it. 
 The interviewee then reflected on the issue of the cell source ani-
mal and the procedures required to extract cells:
They are obviously to some degree discomforting, but it’s worth remembering 
that nobody is pure. Even vegan food production is going to cause some suf-
fering. It’s going to cause some greenhouse gas promotion. It’s going to cer-
tainly kill insects and probably kill other small animals. . . . Realistically, the 
amount of animal suffering [in IVM production] involved is probably not 
more than the amount of suffering involved in getting iceberg lettuce. 
Like the interviewee from New Harvest, the PETA representative pro-
vides an account that problematizes veganism. Whereas the New 
Harvest quotation challenged veganism as a practical strategy for 
achieving animal liberation premised on the difficulty of converting 
meat-eaters to plant-based protein diets, this PETA account draws 
an equivalence between the animal suffering described in vegan 
practice today and an imagined IVM food-production system. This 
interviewee positioned the factory farming of chickens on the less 
ethical end of the spectrum, with IVM situated as more ethical and 
veganism the most ethical, although not without qualification.
 This scenario continues in the account of the next interviewee, 
Elizabeth DeCoux, a lawyer and vegan who campaigns to establish 
a form of animal rights in U.S. law. DeCoux asked to be identified in 
this essay. She attended the first In Vitro Meat Consortium meeting 
in Norway in 2008 to lend support to the technology and articu-
late for the community the characteristics that cultured tissue could 
take to appeal to those associated with animal advocacy. Discussing 
her thinking at the time, she said that “I thought that I would be 
able to support [IVM] as not the very best thing, but probably the 
second best thing that could be done for animals. And if the world 
was not going to turn vegan in the short term, then the idea of one 
cow, one pig, one chicken who was not even kept in a factory farm 
and slaughtered . . . was a very appealing idea.” DeCoux reiterates 
the ethical spectrum rendered in the previous two accounts: that 
is, veganism as an animal-liberation narrative is critiqued for taking 
too long; and IVM, as a second-best strategy, is represented as in-
volving low levels of animal use—one cow, one pig, one chicken—
that could deliver positive benefits. However, in the years follow-
ing her involvement in the Norway meeting, DeCoux had a change 
of opinion, redrawing IVM outside the boundaries of appropriate 
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animal-liberation strategies. Describing her rationalization for this, 
she said that
[a]pparently, there is work being done with stem cells. I’m not opposed to 
work with stem cells in general . . . one approach that’s being taken is growing 
embryos from animal stem cells in order to harvest the meat in some way. 
And, of course, an embryo is very different from a sheet of cells, to me. . . . I’m 
not a scientist, but if you’re causing embryos to grow, it’s not clear to me 
whether there’s any nervous system, circulatory system, what the status is, but 
I know that the growth of embryos is involved, and that is a deal breaker for 
me. . . . One of the possible growth mediums was the blood of fetal calves. It 
has all the horrors of the slaughterhouse. 
 The interviewee invokes the status of the cell source animal and 
the use of animal tissue—the blood of fetal calves—to demarcate IVM 
production as unacceptable practice. DeCoux’s account can be criti-
cized as a misrepresentation, in that current laboratory work tries to 
grow cells from destroyed embryos, as opposed to growing embryos 
from cells, as the interviewee describes. However, DeCoux’s key is-
sue of the status of embryo would be relevant in both versions. Her 
account emphasizes the potential fragility of the animal-liberation 
ethical boundary-work during these early stages of development, as 
a once committed supporter of the field became an equally commit-
ted critic. During these early stages, the discursive strategies of de-
scribing IVM as a technology for animal liberation are also undergo-
ing a process of development as boundaries are drawn between what 
are and what are not in the interests of imagined future nonhuman 
animals in imagined future food-production systems. 
Conclusions 
 The data presented in this essay demonstrate diversity in the un-
derstandings and motivations of the individuals involved in the 
IVM field. While including two broad groups of participants—scien-
tists, and others associated with animal-advocacy positions—there 
are clear differences within each. Some scientists associated their 
interest in IVM with their existing nonmeat consumption; others 
consume meat, but expressed dissatisfaction with current meat-
producing practices and identified IVM as an appropriate strategy 
for addressing this; while still others distanced themselves from, or 
positioned themselves carefully toward, animal-liberation narra-
tives. Of the three animal activists represented, one shifted from a 
pro- to an anti-IVM position; all three problematized the animal-
liberation narrative of veganism in order to leverage a space for sup-
porting IVM. These positions also worked to produce a shared space 
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in which bioscientists and animal advocates may align their efforts 
and ethics on the same socio-technological project.
 Ethical boundary-work is evident in the data. Interviewees po-
sitioned different approaches to IVM production, as well as to 
meat-eating and, in some cases, veganism, across ethical spectrums, 
representing their own preferences and those of imagined future 
consumers. The interviewees discussed cell source animals: imag-
ined future animals in imagined future food-production systems. 
The discourses sought to demonstrate, and thereby constitute, ap-
propriate moral guardianship over these animals by focusing on 
their living standards in comparison to today’s industrial farmed 
animals, and by drawing equivalence to animals kept in domestic 
environments as pets. While retaining relationships of human con-
trol and the normality of animal bodies’ contribution to human-
centered production, the interviewees identified a significantly im-
proved life experience for cell source animals premised on standards 
of care, avoidance of slaughter, and significantly reduced numbers of 
animals involved. However, three alternative technical approaches 
were discussed that, in turn, were interpreted differently in terms 
of their ethicality: namely, the embryonic, adult, and umbilical cell 
sourcing techniques. The embryonic was positioned as the ideal by 
one interviewee, but was criticized by another, just as the adult ap-
proach was characterized by one interviewee as involving killing 
animals, but was cited by another as permissible with the use of 
anaesthesia. In practice, in some instances, such tissue is taken from 
slaughterhouses. 
 A key theme of the analysis is that the ethical boundary-work 
found in the emergent promissory narratives engages with the on-
tological ambiguity about what IVM is and what it can do. In one 
account, IVM was cited as identical to meat as recognized today, the 
two only being differentiated by the respective roles of animal bod-
ies in their production and their positions on an ethical spectrum. 
Here, future consumers were imagined to have specific moral pref-
erences, flavor aesthetics, and financial capacities that would lead 
them to consume IVM because it is a product that liberates animals. 
Another interviewee recognized a difference between IVM and nor-
mal meat, and the slightly differently configured moral, aesthetic, 
and financial characteristics of imagined future consumers would 
lead them to consume IVM most of the time, while occasionally 
spending more on luxury “normal” meats. Central to the analysis 
presented here is the observation that both accounts invoke con-
stellations of future technologies, economies, and consumers that 
assert how IVM would be used—what it does and what it is, the first 
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positioning it as meat, the second allowing a more open interpreta-
tion, with meat and IVM presented as alternatives. 
 Speculation has a clear role in these accounts, as the interviewees 
acknowledge. The accounts draw together the ethical and the imag-
ined in a future that all are aware is far from the realities of current 
IVM technology. However, some of the accounts have more explic-
itly drawn together the ethical, the imagined, and the material as 
experienced today, which, in turn, requires other forms of ethical 
boundary-work and again ties the promissory to the ontological. A 
key example is the mismatch between fetal bovine serum currently 
in use and the narrative of animal liberation: as one interviewee re-
marked, “you don’t want that if you want to have an animal-free 
meat.” The use of this serum troubles the account of what IVM can 
do and what it is. In response to this, the ethical boundary-work of 
binding IVM to both an imagined future in which blue-green algae 
functions as a replacement and the material reality of the existing 
early stage blue-green algae research in Amsterdam is a repeated el-
ement of the current IVM animal-liberatory promissory narrative. 
Promise, ethics, and ontology are coproduced.
 The relationship between promise and ontology has been elabo-
rated elsewhere in the sociology of expectations literature. Pickers-
gill’s account of the therapeutic promise of neuroscience presents 
a case in which the promise of the technology—neuroscience—is 
used “to make clear the ambiguous ontology of personality disor-
der and, consequently, to provide an account of how it might be 
treated.”34 Milne’s account of genetically modified crops used to pro-
duce pharmaceuticals demonstrates that “boundaries between food 
and non-food are renegotiated” as researchers work to address safety 
fears that pharmaceutical and food crops could be confused in an 
“attempt to re-establish the promise of the technology.”35 Both case 
studies overlap with the IVM case while also exhibiting key differ-
ences. In Pickersgill’s case, the site of ontological ambiguity is the 
problem to be addressed (personality disorder), and the authorita-
tive stability of the imagined technology (neuroscience) is used to 
make this clear; in Milne’s, the researchers work to assert that their 
pharmaceutical-producing crops are ontologically distinct from 
food, and therefore cannot be confused with food to establish their 
safety. With IVM, in contrast to Pickersgill’s case, it is the technol-
ogy that is ontologically ambiguous; and in contrast to Milne’s case, 
the IVM researchers work to assert that their technology is food, 
34. Pickersgill, “‘Promising’ Therapies” (above, n. 10), p. 458.
35. Milne, “Drawing Bright Lines” (above, n. 12), p. 143.
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although some ambiguity remains over its status as meat. Yet in all 
three accounts presented here, the promissory, the material, and the 
ontological work together.
 The ongoing ethical boundary-work concerning IVM is compli-
cated and nuanced. While participants in the field accept as unprob-
lematic the notion that IVM will improve the situation of nonhu-
man animals, the exact form that this animal-liberatory narrative 
will take is still undergoing a process of negotiation. This is occur-
ring in a context in which the technology remains in an early stage 
and may or may not be ultimately developed to a level where it 
could deliver on any of the various promises associated with the 
technology today. Any robustness brought to the promissory narra-
tives of IVM will result from socio-technical learning and will con-
tribute to bringing ontological meaning to what IVM is, in any of 
the multiple forms it could take. 
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